CITY OF JERSEY CITY
Office of the Mayor
AFTER ACTION REPORT
January 25, 2026 Winter Storm Event
Prepared by: Stu Thomas, Isaac Smith, Nathaniel Styer
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
What Happened
On January 25, 2026, Jersey City faced its most significant winter storm in approximately a decade. Over 9 inches of snow fell at rates reaching 2 inches per hour during peak intensity. Governor Mikie Sherrill declared a state of emergency, calling it the most substantial winter weather event the region had experienced in ten years.
While the city deployed over 60 pieces of snow removal equipment and activated emergency operations, the response fell short. The storm didn't create the problem, but it exposed one that had been building for years.
The Core Problem: A Department Broken by Neglect
The January 25 storm revealed that Jersey City's Department of Public Works was unprepared to handle a major winter weather event. This wasn't a matter of insufficient effort on behalf of individual DPW employees, but an organizational collapse caused by a decade of neglect.
The department attempted to manage a major snow emergency with:
• No staffing plan for a long duration storm. Any storm over 16 hours, requires multiple shifts. However, the existing snow plan did not put available staff on rotating shifts, and there was no process or plan for bringing in auxiliary/contracted staff.
• Leadership lacked experience managing a live event of significant size after 10 years without major winter weather
• Zero process for quality control to ensure plowing occurred as directed. For example, no one tracked – or could even sign-in to see - the existing GPS on each plow.
• Paper-based systems from the 1990s were used to deploy staff and equipment
• No dedicated dispatch office eliminated years earlier by the previous administration
•
Outdated snow route maps that did not include new streets.
• No plan or equipment for bike lane clearance
• No plan or equipment for clearing pedestrian infrastructure
• No training programs for snow operations
• Extremely low staff morale
• A primary salt vendor that failed to deliver contracted and requested supplies before the storm
The result: inconsistent coverage across neighborhoods, delayed clearance of residential streets, and icy conditions on sidewalks and crosswalks that persisted for days after the storm ended.
Why This Happened: A Decade of Organizational Atrophy
The root causes identified in this Report go far beyond the January storm:
Leadership Gaps: The current DPW Director, Walter Kierce, has served in a "temporary capacity" for over six years after being asked to step in following the unplanned departure of the previous director. He also serves as Director of Emergency Management and has requested to step aside from DPW to focus entirely on emergency management once a new director is appointed.
Inefficient Resource Deployment: Personnel were not effectively organized to deal with a largescale snow event. Technology upgrades were partially implemented without integration into broader operations. The organization lost institutional knowledge when experienced personnel departed without succession planning.
Eliminated Essential Functions: The previous administration eliminated the dispatch office and reassigned personnel. Clerical staff who maintained operational records and deployment tracking were cut. This left no one responsible for real-time operational tracking or post-event analysis.
No Preparation Between Events: Without significant snow for a decade, the organization never practiced, trained, or updated procedures. When the January storm hit, staff were attempting to execute operations they had never performed with systems they didn't understand using maps that no longer reflected reality.
The Path Forward: Comprehensive Organizational Reform
This After-Action Report provides a detailed roadmap for rebuilding DPW capacity. The recommendations are organized by priority and include specific timelines:
Actions already taken by the Solomon Administration
• Launched a nationwide search for experienced DPW Director with proven snow operations background
• Created a Digital Deployment System replacing paper-based processes
• Deployed GPS Fleet Management System with real-time tracking
• Immediately changed our salt supplier after vendor failure
• Addressed staffing shortages through effective shift scheduling
• Immediately instituted plans for addressing staff morale, including providing meals for the duration of the storm
• Actively addressed properties that are frequently reported for non-compliance with sidewalk and crosswalk snow removal
• Established Clear Incident Command Structure with empowered leadership
Short-Term Priorities:
• Integrate CCTV cameras into operations command center
• Establish Equipment Maintenance and Capital Replacement Program
Medium-Term Improvements:
• Establish Training Academy for snow operations
• Complete union contract negotiations addressing the fact that key DPW employees have not received a raise in seven years.
• Launch communication campaign to property owners about their responsibility to clear sidewalks AND crosswalks to the plow-line
• Establish Sidewalk and Crosswalk Clearing Protocols for pedestrian safety
Ongoing Commitments:
• Buy equipment that fits pedestrian safety and bike infrastructure
• Implement continuous improvement cycle with debriefs after every event
• Establish seasonal planning calendar ensuring year-round readiness
• Build a culture of performance and excellence
What This Means for Residents:
The January 25 storm proved that a piece of Jersey City's essential infrastructure services had deteriorated to the point where they could no longer function during a major weather event. Residents in some neighborhoods received comprehensive service while others were left waiting days for street clearance and safe crosswalks.
The findings in this report demonstrate:
• This was not an execution failure – this was a systems failure. DPW was attempting to execute with inadequate systems and protocols
• Rebuilding personnel and operational systems has an immediate impact – demonstrated by improved service during the second winter storm of 2026
• Technology systems existed but were never integrated or activated
• Staff shortages weren't new—they had been flagged repeatedly without resolution
• The organization had been "out of practice" for ten years without real world practice and off-season training of employees
Implementation will require:
• Sustained mayoral oversight and commitment
• Ongoing proactive maintenance and systems upkeep
• Professional leadership selection based on competence
• A focus on building up staff morale
• Accountability at every level of city government
The Bottom Line
Jersey City's residents deserve a Department of Public Works that provides professional, consistent service regardless of which neighborhood they live in. This After Action Report provides a transparent accounting of what went wrong during the January 25 Winter Storm event, while providing concrete recommendations for a path towards competent, long-term stability and delivery service at the Department of Public Works.
WHAT WENT WELL (STRENGTHS)
Equipment Staging and Resource Positioning
Over 60 pieces of snow removal equipment were successfully staged and ready for deployment. Salt storage locations were identified and prepared (though not fully stocked due to a failure to deliver by Morton Salt).
Emergency Operations Center Activation
The EOC successfully activated at Level 2 and maintained coordination throughout the event. Good coordination between DPW and Public Safety to address down trucks and cars parked in cross sections or double parked.
Parking Management Innovation
The designation and opening of free public parking lots provided residents with alternatives to street parking. Google Maps was used to quickly stand up an accessible portal for residents to available parking.
Real-Time Resident Response System
The Resident Response Center (201-547-4900) maintained staffing to receive and process resident reports during the storm. Acting Public Safety Director Anthony Ambrose accelerated the placement of a Deputy Chief to oversee the city’s 911 system and begin implementing reforms in anticipation of the storm. The RRC was directly connected with Code Compliance and the Department of Public Works to quickly relay resident concerns.
Pre-Storm Communication and Public Information
The City executed a comprehensive, multi-channel communication strategy that successfully informed residents about storm preparations, parking requirements, and safety protocols. The creation of interactive snow emergency route maps represented a significant improvement over previous administrations' static, outdated maps.
WHAT NEEDS IMPROVEMENT
Organizational Readiness and Institutional Knowledge
CRITICAL FAILURE: DPW was fundamentally unprepared for a significant snow event after a decade without major winter weather operations.
Specific Issues:
• No significant snow events in approximately 10 years
• Organization completely out of practice for major snow removal operations
• Lack of organizational clarity, clear chain of command, and empowered leadership with experience managing snow events
• Lost institutional knowledge when key training personnel departed
• No regular snow training programs for staff
• No equipment or protocols for clearing pedestrian safety and cyclist infrastructure
Impact: Entire organization operating without institutional memory, established procedures, or practiced expertise needed to execute complex multi-day snow operations.
Partitioned overlapping issues into operational and human factors categories
Inefficient Personnel Deployment
CRITICAL FAILURE: DPW did not have a comprehensive plan for staff deployment in the face of a long-duration storm.
Specific Issues:
• No plans to deploy staff in shifts during extended operations — leadership failed to deploy staff effectively for long-duration events. Functionally, this meant burning staff out with long hours and receiving decreasing quality of work as the storm continued.
• No pool of trained non-DPW staff available to assist during major events
• No plan for feeding and maintaining staff during long response periods
Impact: The lack of personnel deployment plans prevented comprehensive coverage across the city; existing staff were stretched beyond sustainable limits during multi-day operations.
Low Employee Morale
CRITICAL FAILURE:
Years of underinvestment in DPW's workforce created conditions that undermined staff performance and retention heading into the storm.
Specific Issues:
• Outdated union contracts creating labor tensions and unresolved compensation grievances
• No recognition or support systems for staff working extended hours during major weather events
• Long-term pattern of neglect eroded institutional pride and commitment to the department's mission
Impact: Low morale reduced the department's ability to sustain performance during a demanding, multi-day operation and compounded the effects of inadequate deployment planning.
Eliminated Dispatch
CRITICAL FAILURE: The previous mayoral administration’s elimination of the dispatch office removed essential operational support functions.
Specific Issues:
• Dispatch office eliminated; personnel reassigned to other roles
• No personnel maintaining spreadsheets and operational files
• No one ensuring deployment records are current and accurate
• Weakened ability to track operations in real-time
• Compromised ability to conduct post-event analysis without accurate records
Impact: Command staff unable to track deployment effectively; historical data unavailable for planning; accountability mechanisms compromised.
Antiquated Technology Systems
CRITICAL FAILURE: Technology systems are out-of-date or not integrated into operations. Recommendations on improving snow scheduling and routing systems were never funded.
Specific Issues:
• GPS tracking systems not integrated into operational planning or monitoring
• CCTV systems not integrated into snow operations command center
• Paper-based systems still primary method for tracking
• No real-time tracking capabilities for equipment location or coverage
• No digital tools for operators (tablets for routing and mapping)
• Impact: Command staff operating blind without real-time situational awareness; unable to identify coverage gaps or verify work completion; no accountability for operator performance.
Outdated Snow Maps and Routes:
CRITICAL FAILURE: Snow removal maps and routes have not been updated since the 1990s.
Specific Issues:
• Maps date from 1990s—multiple decades out of date
• Routes designed for different city with different infrastructure
• Do not account for new roads, new development, changed traffic patterns, or population shifts
• Drivers are provided with physical paper books with outdated maps
• No integration of bike lanes or pedestrian infrastructure added in recent years
Impact: Operators following routes designed for a fundamentally different city; new infrastructure (bike lanes) not accounted for.
Lack of Clear Operational Protocols
No standardized protocols with clear triggers for different levels of storm severity.
Specific Issues:
• No standardized protocols for scaling up plowing operations based on storm intensity
• No clear thresholds for activating emergency snow removal contracts
• No protocols for mobilizing smaller-scale operations vs. full-scale response
• No provision for smaller scale snow removal operations (ie clearing corners and cross walks)
• Protocols do not adapt to severity of storm conditions
• No integration of resources across County, Municipal Utility Authority, DPW divisions, and contractors
Impact: Ad-hoc decision making during crisis; inconsistent response; resources not mobilized efficiently based on storm characteristics.
Intergovernmental Coordination Gaps
Unclear responsibility for streets under different jurisdictions.
Specific Issues:
• Confusion about state vs. county vs. city street ownership
• No clear assignment of responsibility for each street – including sidewalks and bike lanes
• Some streets fell through gaps between jurisdictions
• No integrated strategic plan incorporating contracts held across governments and authorities
Impact: Some streets not serviced because jurisdiction unclear; duplicated effort on some streets while others neglected.
Salt Supply Chain Failure
CRITICAL FAILURE: Primary salt vendor (Morton Salt) failed to deliver contracted salt before storm. Multiple orders were made in the month prior to the storm, and the vendor failed to deliver on time. Due to DPW leadership’s inexperience with large-scale storms, they estimated that the amount of salt on hand would be sufficient – it was not.
Specific Issues:
• Morton Salt unresponsive and failed to deliver on orders
• Orders placed December 29, January 19, January 21 (total 4,900 tons)
• Only 650 tons received before storm event
• Salt dome not full in November as it should have been
• No accountability mechanisms for vendor performance
• Limited vendor diversification
• No escalation protocols to mayoral level for delivery failures
Impact: Limited salting operations during peak intensity periods; reduced effectiveness of snow removal; emergency procurement required.
Aging Equipment Without Capital Planning
Equipment fleet aging without strategic replacement planning.
Specific Issues:
• No capital plan for long-term vehicle replacement
• Equipment aging beyond optimal service life
• Some equipment not correct type for current city infrastructure - specific equipment purchase requests for maintaining bike lanes and the Newark Avenue pedestrian plaza were repeatedly denied
• No strategic assessment of equipment needs relative to current city layout
• No city investment in equipment to clean bike lanes and pedestrian safety infrastructure - specialized equipment was proposed however due to budget constraints funding was denied
Impact: Equipment failures during operations; reduced operational efficiency; some infrastructure (bike lanes) not serviceable with existing equipment.
Absence of Training Programs
No regular training or professional development for snow operations. No standard operating procedures were in place for regular practices. Additionally, there were too few inspectors to follow up to ensure that work is being done thoroughly.
Specific Issues:
• No snow training classes conducted in recent years
• Lost the personnel who conducted previous trainings
• Staff turnover without training replacement personnel
• No fall training sessions to prepare for winter season
• No leadership development programs
• No training in new technologies or best practices
Impact: Staff unprepared to execute snow operations; no shared understanding of protocols; reduced operational efficiency.
Lack of Quality Control
No mechanisms for ensuring that performed work is high-quality and no system for remediating sub-par work. No system to feed real-time information on quality of snow operations to DPW leadership.
Specific Issues:
• No system for managing quality of performed work during storms
• No accountability for incomplete coverage or plans for remediation
• Inefficient deployment of supervisors
• No data-driven management
Impact: No accountability culture; performance issues not identified or addressed; continuous improvement impossible without measurement.
Communication Gaps on Resident Responsibilities
Insufficient advance communication to property owners about obligations.
Specific Issues:
• Landlords, property owners, and businesses not made aware of responsibilities sufficiently early
• No systematic outreach campaign before winter season
• Enforcement inconsistent
• Education materials not distributed widely enough
Impact: Many property owners unprepared or unaware of legal obligations; sidewalks not cleared in timely manner; accessibility compromised.
RECOMMENDATIONS
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE:
Mayoral staff will oversee the comprehensive reform of the Department of Public Works to ensure accountability and implementation of all recommendations.
Strategic Recommendations:
Nationwide Search for Professional DPW Leadership
PRIORITY: CRITICAL
TIMELINE: Immediate (recruitment launch within 30 days)
Actions Required:
• Conduct nationwide search for DPW Director with snow event management experience
• Require state certification in relevant areas
• Prioritize candidates with deep knowledge of municipal public works best practices and a track record of modernizing operations
• Ensure candidate has experience managing complex multi-day winter operations
• Establish clear lines of authority that put high-skilled leaders in positions of authority
• Focus on professional management culture, not political connections
Responsible Party: Mayor's Office, Business Administrator
Comprehensive Snow Response Plan Overhaul
PRIORITY: CRITICAL
TIMELINE: Complete before next winter season
Actions Required:
• Develop protocols that adapt to severity of storm (light, moderate, severe, extreme)
• Create clear triggers for pre-treating roads based on weather forecasts
• Reassess and update “snow emergency routes” and define the conditions for activation
• Establish thresholds for scaling up plowing operations
• Define protocols for activating emergency snow removal contracts
• Have clear standard operating procedures for moving from plowing operations to snow removal and corner/crosswalk clearing – including an expanded staffing plan that includes contractors
• Integrate resources across County, Municipal Utility Authority (shared services), all DPW divisions, and contractors
• Develop separate protocols for short-duration vs. extended events
• Define protocols for sustained operations over 24, 48, 72+ hour periods
Responsible Party: New DPW Director, Director of OEMHS, Business Administrator
Complete Route Optimization with Updated Maps
PRIORITY: CRITICAL
TIMELINE: Complete before next winter season
Actions Required:
• Completely redesign snow routes reflecting current city (not 1990s city)
• Update all maps to reflect current infrastructure, development patterns, population distribution
• Integrate bike lanes and pedestrian infrastructure into routing
• Ensure every street has an assignment with clear jurisdictional responsibility
• Coordinate with state and county to clarify responsibility for every road
• Create plan for state roads, county roads, and city streets
• Make maps and routes available online and on tablets for operators
• Ensure no streets fall through jurisdictional gaps
• Prioritize residential streets appropriately in new route structure
• Account for new infrastructure not present when 1990s maps were created
Responsible Party: New DPW Director
Comprehensive Technology Modernization
PRIORITY: CRITICAL
TIMELINE: Phase 1 complete before next winter season
Actions Required:
• Fully integrate GPS tracking systems into operational command center
• Activate and utilize dash cameras on all equipment during operations
• Integrate CCTV systems into snow operations monitoring
• Eliminate paper-based systems; implement digital tracking and reporting
• Provide tablets with routing and mapping software to all operators
• Create real-time tracking dashboards for command staff
• Implement digital deployment and time-tracking systems
• Train all personnel on new technology platforms
• Create digital archive for post-event analysis
• Establish systems to track staff deployment in real-time
Responsible Party: New DPW Director
Resources Required: Significant budget allocation for hardware, software, training
Shift Work Planning, Auxiliary Staffing, and Operational Deployment
PRIORITY: CRITICAL
TIMELINE: Assessment complete within 60 days; implementation ongoing
Actions Required:
• Recreate emergency dispatch office with dedicated, trained personnel for major events
• Identify and train pool of non-DPW city personnel available for snow response
• Provide baseline snow operations training to auxiliary personnel pool
• Create shift work schedules that allow for extended operations
• Reorganize across departments to find staffing efficiencies where possible
• Streamline processes to reduce duplicative work
• Assess auxiliary support capacity across city departments
• Develop protocols for feeding and maintaining staff during long response periods
Responsible Party: New DPW Director, Human Resources, Business Administrator
Resources Required: Coordination across departments; budget for shift scheduling, auxiliary personnel training, and contractor pre-positioning
Mandatory Training and Professional Development Program
PRIORITY: HIGH
TIMELINE: First training session before winter 2026; annual program ongoing
Actions Required:
• Institute mandatory fall snow operations training class for all DPW personnel
• Conduct annual training every fall before winter season
• Develop training curriculum covering:
- Equipment operation and maintenance
- Route execution and navigation
- GPS and technology systems
- Communication protocols
- Safety procedures
- Quality standards
• Create leadership development program for supervisors
• Provide specialized training for dispatch personnel
• Document all training materials for institutional knowledge preservation
• Designate training coordinator position
• Conduct table-top exercises before each season
• Train non-DPW auxiliary personnel in baseline operations
Responsible Party: New DPW Director, Training Coordinator
Resources Required: Training curriculum development, dedicated training personnel
Salt Supply Chain Resilience and Vendor Accountability
PRIORITY: HIGH
TIMELINE: Complete before next winter season
Actions Required:
• Replace Morton Salt as primary vendor; select Atlantic Salt or other reliable contractor – scheduled for February 25, 2026 City Council meeting
• Hold Morton Salt contractually accountable for delivery failures
• Diversify salt vendors (minimum 3 approved, reliable suppliers)
• Negotiate delivery guarantee clauses with financial penalties for non-performance
• Ensure salt dome is full between storms and maintains capacity
• Establish requirement: salt dome must be full by November 1 each year
• Create escalation protocols to Mayor's office if vendors fail to deliver on schedule
• Establish emergency procurement relationships with neighboring municipalities
• Consider increasing storage capacity beyond current 2,500 tons
• Work directly with vendors to ensure deliveries are completed on time
• Create accountability mechanisms for vendor performance
Responsible Party: New DPW Director, Purchasing Department, Mayoral Staff
Resources Required: Contract negotiations, potential storage expansion
Performance Management and Accountability Systems
PRIORITY: HIGH
TIMELINE: Implement within 90 days
Actions Required:
• Institute mandatory performance evaluations for all DPW personnel
• Establish clear performance metrics and standards
• Require supervisors to conduct regular performance-based reviews
• Create accountability mechanisms for incomplete work or poor performance
• Implement data-driven management approach
• Establish consequence protocols for inadequate performance
• Link performance to advancement and compensation where possible
• Create transparency in performance data
• End culture of patronage by replacing it with culture of professional excellence
• Break the hold of machine politics using DPW for patronage jobs
Responsible Party: New DPW Director, Human Resources, Business Administrator
Enhanced Inspector Capacity and Quality Control
PRIORITY: HIGH
TIMELINE: Implement before next winter season
Actions Required:
• Ensure adequate staffing to allow supervisors to perform inspections and oversight role
• Identify additional city personnel who can be trained as snowplow inspectors
• Create systematic inspection protocols with digital reporting
• Assign inspectors to monitor cleanup in real-time during operations
• Establish protocols for responding to constituent flags and complaints
• Implement post-event neighborhood-by-neighborhood verification
• Establish service level standards with measurement criteria
• Create accountability mechanisms for incomplete coverage
• Integrate resident complaint data into quality control system
• Publish service completion reports by neighborhood
Responsible Party: New DPW Director
Resources Required: Additional inspector staffing; digital reporting systems
Intergovernmental Coordination Framework
PRIORITY: MEDIUM
TIMELINE: Agreements complete within 120 days
Actions Required:
• Engage with state DOT and county officials to clarify every street's jurisdictional responsibility
• Create comprehensive master list: every street assigned to city, county, or state
• Build strategic plan for snow removal that integrates contracts held across governments and authorities
• Establish coordination protocols with intergovernmental partners
• Create shared communication systems for multi-jurisdictional operations
• Formalize mutual aid agreements with Hudson County municipalities
• Establish pre-negotiated rates for emergency equipment rental
• Conduct joint training exercises with partnering agencies
Responsible Party: Intergovernmental Affairs, New DPW Director, OEMHS
Resources Required: Staff time for coordination and agreement development
Capital Equipment Planning and Fleet Modernization
PRIORITY: MEDIUM
TIMELINE: Assessment within 90 days; multi-year implementation
Actions Required:
• Develop comprehensive capital plan for long-term vehicle replacement
• Assess current equipment age and condition
• Identify equipment needs for current city infrastructure (including bike lanes)
• Acquire appropriate equipment types for modern city layout
• Create multi-year budget for systematic fleet replacement
• Ensure equipment purchases align with current city needs, not past configuration
• Plan for specialized equipment (bike lane clearance, pedestrian infrastructure)
Responsible Party: New DPW Director, Budget Office
Resources Required: Multi-year capital budget allocation
Equipment for Bike Lanes
PRIORITY: HIGH
Timeline: Before the next snow season
Actions Required:
• Identify equipment needs for bike lanes (another other smaller/non-standard infrastructure) that require specialized machines.
• Begin the purchase of specialized equipment
• Integrate bike lane clearing operations explicitly into updated snow plan
Responsible Party: New DPW Director, Business Administrator
Modernized Dispatch and Records Management
PRIORITY: MEDIUM
TIMELINE: Complete within 120 days
Actions Required:
• Recreate dispatch operation with modern technology platform
• Identify and bring back dispatch staff for major events
• Implement modern dispatch system replacing paper-based processes
• Create digital staffing and deployment tracking forms
• Eliminate duplicative work across pen/paper and digital systems
• Hire clerical staff to maintain operational files and records
• Ensure someone is responsible for keeping spreadsheets and tracking data current
• Create digital archive accessible for planning and analysis
Responsible Party: New DPW Director, IT Department
Resources Required: Dispatch software, hardware, personnel
Seasonal Planning and Continuous Improvement
PRIORITY: ONGOING
TIMELINE: Implement immediately
Actions Required:
• Prepare for next season immediately after current season ends
• Winter → Spring: Focus on snow melt management and initial trash cleanup
• Spring → Summer: Resume normal sweeping schedules, equipment maintenance
• Summer → Fall: Conduct training, update plans, verify supplies
• Fall → Winter: Final preparations, salt dome verification, equipment testing
• After each event: Conduct immediate debrief and capture lessons learned
• Maintain continuous improvement cycle
• Update plans and protocols based on each event experience
Responsible Party: New DPW Director
Resources Required: Dedicated planning time and resources
Advance Communication to Property Owners
PRIORITY: MEDIUM
TIMELINE: Launch 120 days before winter season
Actions Required:
• Launch comprehensive communication campaign to landlords, property owners, businesses
• Emphasize legal responsibilities for sidewalk clearing
• Provide education on approved de-icing materials and proper techniques
• Communicate early and constantly about requirements
• Use multiple languages and channels
• Create enforcement consequences for non-compliance
• Publish enforcement activity to demonstrate accountability
Responsible Party: Communications Department, Code Enforcement
Resources Required: Multi-channel communication campaign budget
ACTIONS TAKEN FOR THE FEBRUARY 22, 2026 BLIZZARD
The failures of the January 25 storm prompted an immediate and comprehensive operational overhaul. In the weeks between the January and February events, the Solomon Administration moved quickly to address the most critical gaps identified in the January response. The February 22, 2026 blizzard, itself a historic storm twice as large as January’s, served as an early test of whether those reforms had taken hold. The improvements in service delivery were measurable and significant.
Personnel Deployment, Shift Work, and Auxiliary Staffing
One of the January storm’s most damaging failures was the absence of structured shift work, which left DPW personnel stretched across days without adequate rest or relief. For February, DPW implemented rotating shift schedules that ensured continuous coverage for the duration of the storm without exhausting staff capacity. Pre-treatment operations—salting in advance of snowfall—were executed systematically to slow accumulation and reduce the burden on plowing operations once the storm arrived.
Critically, auxiliary staff and contractors were engaged in advance of the storm rather than reactively. By pre-positioning contracted resources, the city was able to activate additional capacity at the outset of the event rather than scrambling to secure it mid-storm—a direct response to the resource shortage that hampered the January response.
Accountability and Quality Control
The January response had no meaningful quality control mechanism—supervisors lacked the tools and structure to verify that work was being completed as reported. For February, the city deployed supervisors in the field in tandem with available technology, including GPS fleet tracking and CCTV integration, to provide real-time situational awareness. This allowed operations leadership to quickly identify coverage gaps, verify completed routes, and redirect resources to areas that needed additional attention. The combination of human oversight and technology-enabled monitoring represented a fundamental shift from the ad-hoc, paper-based approach that characterized the January response.
Salt Supply
The salt supply failure during the January storm—in which primary vendor Morton Salt delivered only 650 of 4,900 contracted tons before the event—was among the most operationally damaging failures of that response. The city moved swiftly to replace Morton Salt as its primary vendor and secured a reliable supplier ahead of the February storm. Salt storage sites were brought to full capacity in advance of the event, ensuring that operations would not be constrained by supply shortages regardless of storm intensity or duration. This change was reflected in significantly more consistent salting coverage throughout the February event.
Operational Command Structure
The January storm exposed the absence of a functioning incident command structure—no clear chain of authority, no assigned operational roles, and no one accountable for the performance of specific geographic areas or functional tasks. For February, the city established a more robust command structure with leadership personnel assigned specific duties and defined areas of responsibility. This structure gave operations managers the authority and accountability needed to make real-time decisions, manage staff deployment, and dispatch resources effectively throughout the storm. Having designated leaders in place, rather than relying on improvised coordination, materially improved the coherence and speed of the response.
Communication with Elected Officials and Outside Partners
A recurring frustration during the January storm was the lack of timely information flowing to local elected leaders, who were themselves fielding constituent complaints without adequate visibility into the status of operations. For February, the city instituted a structured incident reporting process to keep council members and other outside partners consistently informed of operational progress throughout the storm. Regular updates—covering coverage status, resource deployment, and outstanding areas of need—were issued at defined intervals, giving elected officials the information they needed to serve their constituents and providing an additional channel for real-time field intelligence to flow back to operations command.
Pedestrian Infrastructure Prioritization
The January storm left pedestrian infrastructure—intersections, corner ramps, and crosswalks—in dangerous condition for days, drawing significant criticism from residents and presenting real accessibility barriers. In preparation for February, the city identified a set of high-priority intersections and crosswalks for proactive clearance by city crews, with particular attention to locations near transit stops, schools, and areas with high pedestrian traffic. By designating these locations in advance and assigning dedicated resources to clear them as quickly as possible following the storm, the city was able to restore pedestrian mobility more rapidly than in January and reduce the period during which unsafe conditions persisted at critical points in the pedestrian network.
Field-to-Command Communication Protocols
The disconnect between field crews and operations command during the January storm meant that leadership frequently lacked accurate real-time information about where work had been completed, where problems had emerged, and where resources needed to be redirected. For February, the city instituted standard operating procedures governing communication between field personnel and leadership, establishing clear protocols for how and when crews report status, flag issues, and receive updated direction. These procedures reduced the information gaps that had hampered decision-making in January and allowed command staff to manage operations with greater confidence and precision.
Returning Experienced Operational Leaders to Frontline Roles
Among the most consequential personnel decisions made in the aftermath of January was the identification of experienced, high-quality staff who had been pulled from operational roles and placed in administrative positions—effectively sidelining their field expertise. These individuals were returned to frontline leadership roles for the February response, placing operational knowledge and management skill at the point in the organization where it was most needed. This change had an immediate and tangible impact on the coherence of the response, reinforcing the principle that organizational performance depends on putting the right leaders in the right positions rather than fitting capable people into whatever structural vacancies exist.
Taken together, these actions demonstrate that the organizational reforms identified in the aftermath of January were not simply aspirational—they were implemented, tested under real conditions, and shown to produce meaningfully better outcomes. The February response was not perfect, and the longer-term work of rebuilding DPW continues. But the contrast with January reflects what is possible when the right systems, the right leaders, and the right resources are put in place before a storm arrives.
CONCLUSION
The January 25, 2026 winter storm did not simply reveal operational gaps—it exposed the complete collapse of the Department of Public Works' snow operations capacity after a decade of systemic neglect, underinvestment, and political mismanagement.
The department attempted to execute a major snow event with:
• Leadership that had never managed a snow event
• Technological systems that were not even activated or integrated
• Snow route maps from the 1990s designed for a different city
• No dispatch office, no clerical support, no training programs
• A primary salt vendor that failed to deliver on contracts
• No institutional memory of how to execute complex multi-day operations
• Staff that had not received raises in 7 years
• No performance evaluation or accountability systems
This was not a failure of execution—this was attempting to execute with an organization that lacked the systems and protocols to succeed.
The root cause was not the storm's intensity or duration. The root cause was a decade of organizational atrophy that left DPW completely unprepared when a significant winter weather event finally occurred. Systems were antiquated, knowledge was lost, capacity was eliminated, and professional management was allowed to lapse.
The residents of Jersey City deserve a Department of Public Works that functions professionally, regardless of which neighborhood they live in.